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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH

ECHO NEY, TRUSTEE,
WASATCH HOMES, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant
-vs.-

No. 8437

G. T. HARRISON and
ALDA J. HARRISON,
Defendants and Respondents

Petition for Rehearing

The respondents petition the court for a rehearing
with regard to Point 2 of the appeal in the above matter,
which was ruled on by this court on the 3rd day of
July, 1956.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ~IISINTERPRETED THE
FACTS IN THE INSTANT CASE.
POINT II
IF THE COURT DENIES THE PETITION
FOR REHEARING, THE COURT SHOULD
A1IEND ITS REMITTITUR TO REQUIRE ·
TI-IE LO"\VER COURT TO ~fAKE A FINDING
ON THE ISSUE OF THE REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST.

A R G U l\II EN T
POINT I
THE COURT ~IISI~TERPRETED THE
FACTS IN THE INSTANT CASE.
The court misinterpreted the facts in the instant
ease, and in so doing sets forth a distinction between this
ease and the case of Smith Realty Company Y. Dipietro,
77 U. 176, 292 P. 915, which does not exist, the court, commenting on the decision in that ease, stating at page 3,
of the majority opinion:
''The broker neither pleaded nor proved any
contract rxpn'R~ly employing him in writing or
otlwrwisr, but relied ou the recital pertaining to
the payment of a brokerage fee. The court re-
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garded the recital as merely incidental to the contract and therefore ruled that it conferred no
rights on the broker; and accordingly that it could
not be construed as a memorandum in writing employing the broker to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds in the broker's behalf, with which we do
not disagree.''
A thorough examination of Smith v. Dipietro indicates that the court's interpretation of that case is substantially correct ; also, a review of the record in the
case with which this petition is concerned indicates that
the two cases with regard to the point of law herein involved are almost identical.
First, as the court points out in the portion of the
opinion above set forth, ''The broker neither pleaded nor
proved any contract expressly employing him in writing
or otherwise, but relied on a recital pertaining to the payment of a brokerage fee." In the present case, the plaintiff relies solely on the earnest money receipt attached
to the original complaint (R. 1), and as set forth in
Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of plaintiff's amended complaint
(R. 1).
The court, at page 3 of the majority decision, sets
forth a portion of the agreement between the buyer and
seller in the Dipietro case, which is also set forth at 209
P. 916:
''The respective parties hereto agree to pay
the (realtor) the authorized broker, for effecting
the sale and exchange of properties the commissions as follo,vs: The seller agrees to pay a commission in the sum of Five I-Iundred Dollars and
the buyer agrees to pay a commission in the sum
3
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of Three Hundred Thirty-three and 33/100 ...
Dollars. Said commissions payable to the (realtor) at their (address given) .... "
Exhibit ''A'' in the present case is also an agreement
between the buyers and the sellers, and insofar as is
applicable to a commission states:
"The seller agrees in consideration of the efforts of the agent in procuring a purchaser to pay
said agent a commission equal to the minimum
recommended by the Salt Lake Real Estate Board.
In the event sellers have entered into a listing contract with any other agent and the said contract is
presently effective, this paragraph would be of no
force and effect,''
and in the blank at the bottom of Exhibit "A" has been
written the words, "Total commission to be two and onehalf per cent."
The writer contends that that language is merely
incidental to the contract between the seller and buyer
as in the Dipietro case, with which the majority opinion
states this court does not disagree (Page 3 of majority
opinion).
Further, as above noted, the plaintiff and appellant
in the instant case rely upon the earnest money receipt,
Exhibit "A," in itself, not as a memorandum to take an
oral coutract out of the statute of frauds. Xo·where in the
pleadings is there an allegation of a contract, oral or otherwi~P, between the seller and the broker, nor does the
e\·idence show a parole agreement of which the earnest
money receipt is a memorandum.
4
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The plaintiff in her brief sets forth testimony from
Record 22 as follows :

"Q.

Who did you ask if they would help

you?
''A. This Wasatch Homes ; I think they call
it 'Wasatch.'

"Q.

That Mr. Dean Parry1

"A.

Yes."

indicating that she asked Dean Parry to help her sell the
Snow Apartments. Also at Record 22 is the following
testimony:
'' Q. You had listed that property known as
the 'Snow Apartments' for sale, had you not?

"A. No, I had asked different real estate
men if they would help me sell it, but I never
signed any-''
but nowhere in the testimony is there any indication of
the elements of any oral contract which indicates the
duties of the broker contracted for, or the consideration,
if any, for the services to show a contract that the earnest
money receipt would be a memorandum which complied
with the statute of frauds, even if the plaintiff had proceeded on the theory of such a contract, which the pleadings show she did not.
The writer has no quarrel with the decision in Hawaiian Equipment Company, Ltd., v. Eimco Corporation,
115 U. 590, 207 P(2) 794, but contends that the case is
distinguishable from the present case in that the Hawaiian Equipment case is negotiations by telegraph and
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letter between two parties dealing directly with one
another, though one did try to defend on the basis of
being an agent for a third party, while the present case
arises from a claimed agency contract which is nowhere
set out. Nor does the writer disagree with the elements
of the memoranda necessary to make an enforcible contract as set out in the Restatement of Contracts, Section
207. However, it would appear that item (c) thereof, as
related in the majority opinion in this case,
'' (c) the terms and conditions of all the
promises constituting the contract and by whom
the promisses are made,''
is not fulfilled either by the earnest money receipt nor by
the evidence. It would appear from Exhibit "A," the
earnest money receipt, that the duties of the real estate
agent or broker, the amount of the original selling price,
and the basis of time of sale are nowhere set out.
The petitioner is also aware of the difference in the
necessities of pleading at the time of Smith v. Dipietro
and under the new rules as applied to the present case;
however, on the basis that the plaintiff in the present case
proceeded to try to recover not on an oral contract supported by a memorandum, but on an alleged written contract, it would appear that this case should be governed
by Taylor v. E. JYl. Royle Corp., ------------ U. ____________ , 264
P(2) 27!l, where the court sets out:
"F lldl'r the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a
defendant must be extended every reasonable opportunit~· to pn'pare his case and to meet an
adn'rsan·'s claims. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
;)4( {') ( 1).
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''There are circumstances where court can
allow recovery under quantum merit, even though
plaintiff declared on an express contract, but only
if defendant had fair opportunity to be apprised
of and meet issue so presented. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 54 (c) ( 1) . "
POINT II
IF THE COURT DENIES THE PETITION
FOR REHEARING, THE COURT SHOULD
A11:END ITS REMITTITUR TO REQUIRE
THE LOWER COURT TO MAKE A FINDING
ON THE ISSUE OF THE REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST.
In addition to the above contention, it would also
appear from an examination of the pleadings aP-d record
that the lower court found it unnecessary to rule on the
question of whether Echo Ney was the real party in interest, the lower court having found no contract between
the broker and the defendants.
The real party in interest question is set up by the
pleadings. The only evidence of an assignment from
Wasatch Homes or Dean Parry was the testimony of the
attorney for the plaintiff, Gordon T. Hyde, who had also
been an officer of Wasatch Homes. Mr. Hyde had himself
sworn and testified with respect to the assignment:
"In the early spring of 1953, Wasatch Homes,
Incorporated, incurred some obligations which
they were unable to pay to several people, one of
which is the plaintiff in this action, Echo N ey,
and a meeting was held of all the stockholders of
the corporation and of the creditors, at which time
it was decided that the assets of the company
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would be liquidated that I would be authorized to
liquidate the assets and pay them over to these
creditors in satisfaction of the obligations which
the corporation had.
''Pursuant to that, Mrs. N ey and the group of
creditors accepted the proposition, and we proceeded to liquidate these assets and divide the
proceeds.
''This account sued upon is one of the assets
which were assigned to these creditors, and Mrs.
N ey is presently, as trustee for the group, the
assignee and owner of this claim formerly belonging to Wasatch Homes, Incorporated," (R. 61).
and then upon cross-examination testified that there was
no written assignment from either the company or the
creditors to Echo Ney, nothing more than a resolution
which was not reduced to writing at any time. See (Tr.
48, line 12 to 18 Tr. 50, line 17-23) Record 65, 67.
Petitioner contends that in view of the lower court's
failure to rule on the real party in interest question, and
the lack of evidence to show any valid assignment from
Wasatch Homes to the plaintiff in this case, that should
the court deny the rehearing on the basis set forth in ''A''
of this petition, that the court amend its remittitur requiring the low~r court to make a findings with respect to
Echo N ey 's right to recover on any obligation due to
Wasatch Homes as well as to the claimed setoffs in the
remittitur on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
SUl\LXER J. H~\_TCH
Attorneys for Defeudants
a11d Respondents
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